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Setting Course for the Next Five Years: 
Three Steps to Start an Effective  
EU Commission Presidency by Julian Rappold
The designated European Commission President is busy putting together her team of 
Commissioners, which will face Parliamentary scrutiny at the end of October. Now 
is when Ursula von der Leyen is laying the basis for the success or weakness of her 
presidency. This task goes far beyond assigning names to portfolios.
Ursula von der Leyen has already mastered her first chal-
lenge: On July 16, the European Parliament (EP) elected 
her to be the next European Commission President with 
only a narrow majority. However, her weak electoral 
result in the EP will not necessarily translate into a weak 
presidency. To transcend this, she will have to face many 
more hurdles in the weeks to come. First, she will have 
to win over the more critical Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) and flesh out an ambitious work 
program in order to receive a strong mandate for her 
Commission in the next five years. Second, to take office 
on November 1, she will have to build a strong, coherent, 
and efficient team of Commissioners to be approved by 
the EP at the end of October while taking into account the 
demands of the member states and political groups in the 
EP. Third, von der Leyen will ultimately have to build on 
the unanimous support she received from the European 
Council and establish close working relations with future 
European Council President Charles Michel. Only if she 
is able to rally all three institutions behind her will the 
EU be able to tackle the challenges that come with Brexit, 
great power competition, new security threats, climate 
change, and the technological revolution.
Convince the European Parliament
With 383 votes, von der Leyen was elected with only a nar-
row majority of nine votes. Even though the conservative 
European People’s Party (EPP), the Socialists & Democrats 
(S&D), and the liberal Renew Europe group (formerly 
ALDE) had officially endorsed her candidacy, a significant 
number of at least 59 MEPs from these groups did not vote 
for her (in total, all three parties amount to 442 seats in 
the EP). These pro-European MEPs, alongside the Greens, 
opposed von der Leyen mainly because of the nomination 
process in the European Council, which had disregarded 
the so-called “Spitzenkandidaten process”.
In the coming weeks, nominated Commissioners will 
face intense scrutiny in the hearings in the EP before 
requiring official approval at the end of October. Von 
der Leyen will have to use the remaining time to turn 
fragile parliamentary support into a robust mandate for 
her presidency. This is even more so, because Eurosceptic 
governments in Poland, Hungary, and Italy have already 
claimed credit for delivering the decisive votes to bring 
her into office, and they expect something in return – 
certainly both a curse and a blessing that she would like 
to shrug off. Indeed, failing to gather a strong majority 
behind her would mean that von der Leyen would be off 
to a bumpy start with a more-than-ever fragmented EP in 
which decision-making will slow down as the EPP and the 
S&D no longer command a majority.
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Thus, it should be a priority for her to form a strong 
pro-European majority in the EP that she will be able to 
rely on in the next five years. To do so, she should closely 
cooperate with the pro-European groups in the EP to flesh 
out the political guidelines she presented during her first 
speech in the EP. This is certainly a challenging task. She 
has to walk the thin line between appealing to Social 
Democratic and Green MEPs, while at the same time pro-
viding reassurances to her own EPP so that her political 
program does not further lose conservative credentials.
A clear commitment to her agenda to push European 
democracy might swing the pendulum in von der Leyen’s 
favor as this is a topic of broad consensus among the 
pro-European forces in the EP. First, von der Leyen should 
reinforce her willingness to strengthen the role of the EP, 
working toward empowering MEPs de facto to initiate 
legislation. Second, after the failure of the 2019 experi-
ence that left so many MEPs frustrated, von der Leyen 
should quickly agree with the EP on a reform of the lead 
candidate system, including transnational lists of candi-
dates backed by stronger trans-European party structures. 
This should also include a common position on jointly 
pushing the European Council to commit to a binding 
procedure that leads to an agreement way ahead of the 
next EP elections 2024. Third, von der Leyen should invest 
in strengthening the partnership between the Commis-
sion and the EP. On the one hand, she should enhance 
the visibility and responsiveness of her Commissioners 
vis-à-vis the EP in EU decision-making at all levels. On 
the other hand, she should seek close working relations 
not only with the new EP President – the Italian Social 
Democrat David-Maria Sassoli – but also with the leaders 
of the different pro-European groups, given the increased 
fragmentation in the EP. 
Re-Organize the European Commission
Parliamentarians will closely watch the setup of von der 
Leyen’s future team of Commissioners, as it will illustrate 
her ambitions on policy substance. She already success-
fully managed to deliver on her promise of a gender-bal-
anced College. Now, she will have to distribute the port-
folios to the candidates proposed by the 26 member states 
in a way that ensures her team has enough experience 
and expertise to give it political weight. Von der Leyen 
is officially free to tailor the portfolios according to her 
preferences and distribute them among the nominees. In 
addition, she can also reject nominations of the member 
states. However, she will have to try to accommodate na-
tional interests, forcing her to make some tough choices 
and stand up to the member states, as not everybody can 
have a weighty portfolio.
In particular, von der Leyen faces the challenge of 
dealing with an increasing number of Eurosceptic gov-
ernments nominating potentially uncooperative Com-
missioners. Geographical balance will matter, too. After 
the EP elections, all top positions at the helm of the EU 
leadership were filled only with personnel from Western 
Europe, leaving Central and Eastern European member 
states marginalized.
As important as distributing the portfolios is struc-
turing the future Commission in a way that reflects the 
priorities of her presidency and that ensures the con-
sistency of decision-making in order to live up to the 
political promises she has so far made. In that regard, von 
der Leyen should build on the structural changes intro-
duced by the Juncker Commission, with project teams 
delivering on policy priorities. Learning from the past 
experience, these teams should be structured even more 
hierarchically with powerful Vice-Presidents overseeing 
cross-cutting policy priorities such as climate action, the 
single market, or foreign and security policy and coor-
dinating small teams of Commissioners with relevant 
portfolios. The Vice-Presidents should have sufficient re-
sources to develop proposals on their own and the right to 
veto those made by Commissioners in their teams. Such 
a structure could also mitigate unconstructive positions 
from Eurosceptic Commissioners. At the same time, von 
der Leyen should try to engage them as much as possible 
in weighty but politically non-sensitive portfolios such as 
agriculture or transport. These topics are of interest to 
Eurosceptic governments and would thus also strengthen 
their ownership in the overall work of the Commission.
Closely Coordinate with the  
European Council
Von der Leyen emerged from the EU leadership struggle 
with the unanimous backing from the European Coun-
cil (with only Germany abstaining). This is an asset 
she should capitalize on. Yet, the clash over the EU top 
personnel has illustrated that the fragmentation between 
member states in the European Council persists or will 
even increase in the future. Progress on some reforms – 
i.e., on the Eurozone or the Dublin system – have stalled 
because of a lack of political will of the member states. As 
a result, individual member states will face a strong temp-
tation to pursue specific objectives in smaller coalitions 
of the willing. The challenge, then, is to ensure that such 
initiatives are embedded in the overall EU framework and 
follow official EU processes involving the Commission, 
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rather than being decided through intergovernmental 
backroom deals.
Thus, it is especially important to build very close 
working relations with all heads of states and govern-
ments and particularly the new European Council Presi-
dent, Charles Michel. The rivalry between Juncker and 
Michel’s predecessor, Donald Tusk, often impaired the 
smooth cooperation between both institutions – a luxury 
von der Leyen cannot afford. With its Strategic Agenda 
for 2019–2024, the European Council has already set out 
the priority areas that will steer the work of the European 
Council in the next five years, providing direction for von 
der Leyen’s work. For the priorities of her Commission, 
she should take this document as a point of orientation 
and closely consult with the European Council, as well as 
with the EP, to ensure that in the next five years all three 
institutions pull on the same string. Only if von der Leyen 
manages to have a solid pro-European majority in the EP 
and sufficient backing in the European Council will she 
be able to deliver on her political priorities and manage 
future crises.
Julian Rappold is Research Fellow in DGAP’s Alfred von 
Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies.
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